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Studies have demonstrated conscious and non-conscious priming of responses and of
affect. Concerning response priming, presenting a target-related (congruent) distractor
prior to a target typically facilitates target responses. This facilitation – the response-
priming effect – is observed in comparison to a less related (incongruent) distractor.
An incongruent distractor would interfere with the required response to the target. This
response-priming effect is found with both conscious distractors, of which participants
are aware, and non-conscious distractors, of which participants are not aware. In
partly related research, distractors have also yielded affective priming effects on the
evaluations of task-unrelated neutral symbols that followed the target: In comparison
to the congruent condition, participants evaluated a neutral symbol presented after
an incongruent distractor-target sequence as more negative. This affective priming
effect was sometimes ascribed to the participants’ misattributions of distractor-target
conflict to the unrelated neutral symbols. Here, we set out to test this possibility. If the
misattribution explanation of affective priming holds true, affective priming would be
stronger with non-conscious than with conscious distractors: Mostly the non-conscious
distractors would mask distractor-target conflict as the true affect-origin and, therefore,
invite participants’ misattribution of the primed affect to the neutral symbol in temporal
vicinity. In contrast, only with conscious distractors, participants would be aware of
distractor-target conflict as the true affect-origin and should, therefore, be better able
to attribute their affective responses to the distractor-target relationship itself. In three
experiments, we confirmed this prediction of a stronger affective priming effect in
non-conscious than conscious distractor conditions, while at the same time showing
conscious response-priming effects to even exceed non-conscious response-priming
effects. Together, these results amount to a double dissociation between affective
priming, being stronger with unconscious distractors, and response priming, being
stronger with conscious distractors. This double dissociation supports the misattribution
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explanation and makes clear that the amount of distractor-elicited response conflict
alone does not account for the amount of affective priming. Moreover, the participants’
unawareness of the distractors is critical for the amount of affective priming of neutral
symbols in temporal vicinity.
Keywords: flanker task, masking, non-conscious processing, misattributions of affect, conflict
INTRODUCTION
Have you ever snapped at a friend for no apparent reason? Have
you ever felt sad without knowing why? These examples illustrate
that humans can experience negative (or positive) affective
responses without an awareness of the objects that elicited the
affective responses. In the present article, affective responses are
defined as the actual positive or negative impressions that are
elicited by an object, and the true affect-origin is defined as the
object that triggered these impressions. As our examples imply,
humans are sometimes uncertain about the true origins of their
affective responses, an observation in line with emotion theories.
For example, Arnold (1960) explained that emotions can be
triggered without an awareness of their true origins. In general,
Arnold believed that emotions are based on appraisals of objects
or events as positive or negative. These appraisals correspond to
what we called positive and negative affective responses. In the
case of an automatic emotion generation, Arnold argued that
the appraisal process is hidden from introspection, meaning that
participants do not have to become aware of the true affect-
origins. In more recent emotion theories, this claim was repeated.
A number of researchers claimed that feelings that are initially
elicited are only subsequently attributed to an object as its origin
(Schachter and Singer, 1962; Weiner, 1986). For instance, in the
feeling-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990; see also Ortony
et al., 1990), the feeling is the first state of awareness that informs
a person about her own appraisal of the object that triggered the
feeling–that is, before her feeling, this person would not know
whether or not s/he liked an object (i.e., evaluated an object as
positive or negative).
Considered from the perspective of such emotion theories,
a person’s uncertainty about the true affect-origin in general,
and the unawareness of the true affect-origin in particular, could
be favorable side conditions of a misattribution of affective
responses to alternative objects than the true affect-origin (cf.
Zajonc, 1968; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993; Payne et al., 2010).
Over the course of three experiments, we tested this hypothesis.
We primed affective responses by distractors of which our
participants were unaware (i.e., with visually masked distractors)
or aware (i.e., with clearly visible distractors) and tested whether
participants’ unawareness of the masked distractors as the true
affect-origins is a favorable precondition for misattributions of
affective responses away from the masked distractors and toward
neutral objects in close temporal vicinity.
In our experiments, we used response priming to elicit
affective responses (cf. Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013; see also van
Steenbergen et al., 2010). In each trial of our experiments,
participants had to discriminate between the orientations of
a centrally presented target. If the current trial’s target was a
square, participants had to press one key, and if the target
was a diamond, they had to press another key. Prior to the
central target, we presented two distractors at target-adjacent
positions. In congruent trials, the distractor was of the same
shape as the target and, thus, indicated the same response as the
target. In incongruent trials, the distractor was of the alternative
shape as compared to the target and, thus, led to response
conflict between distractor and target. In this experimental
situation, past research has demonstrated that, in comparison to
congruent distractors, incongruent distractors delay the response
to the target. This response-priming effect has been found with
conscious distractors, of which participants were aware (Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974; Gratton et al., 1988), and with non-conscious
distractors, of which participants were not aware (Schwarz and
Mecklinger, 1995). However, with non-conscious distractors, this
response-priming effect is typically weaker than with conscious
distractors (Tapia et al., 2010).
Critically, in incongruent conditions a response conflict also
elicits more negative affective responses than in congruent
conditions where a response conflict is absent. This affective
priming effect is measured in evaluations of neutral symbols that
follow the distractor and the target in close temporal vicinity.
Affective priming of neutral symbols through response conflict
has hitherto been demonstrated with conscious distractors in
a Stroop paradigm only (Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013). In their
experiment, participants showed more negative ratings of a
neutral Chinese symbol if presented after an incongruent Stroop
(a mismatch between a color word and the print color of
the word, e.g., GREEN printed in red) than after a congruent
(GREEN printed in green) Stroop. Studies showing that affective
priming of neutral objects have sometimes been ascribed to
misattributions of affective responses away from the eliciting
stimulus and toward the neutral symbol or object (Payne et al.,
2005).
Here, we tested this misattribution explanation of affective
priming. If misattributions account for affective priming,
affective priming could be stronger with non-conscious than
with conscious affect-origins. The reason is that with conscious
affect-origins, participants are well aware of degree of the
distractor-target incongruence as the true affect-origin. This
makes it less likely that the participants misattribute the same
affective response elicited by the distractor-target pair also to
a different neutral symbol following the distractor and target
(cf. Oikawa et al., 2011). In contrast, with non-conscious
affect-origins, participants are not aware of the distractor-target
incongruence as the true affect-origin. This could foster the
misattribution of the distractor-elicited affective response to
the neutral symbol that follows the distractor and target. In
other words, affective priming effects for a neutral symbol
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could be stronger with non-conscious distractors than with
conscious distractors, despite the fact that response priming
could be stronger with conscious distractors than with non-
conscious distractors. Together, these expectations thus amount
to the prediction of a double dissociation between response
priming and affective priming by non-conscious and conscious
distractors.
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of our study was to assess the influence of conscious
and non-conscious conflict on the evaluation of a neutral symbol.
Conflict was elicited by target-distractor congruence in a flanker
task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). We chose a flanker task
because non-conscious conflict is established very well in this
task (Schwarz and Mecklinger, 1995; Tapia et al., 2010) and is less
controversial than with other congruence tasks (e.g., Stroop tasks,
see Kouider and Dupoux, 2004).
To measure affective priming, participants additionally rated a
neutral Chinese symbol as positive or negative at the end of some
trials. If target-distractor incongruence elicits more negative
affective responses than target-distractor congruence and if these
affective responses are (sometimes) misattributed, we expected
more negative evaluations of the symbols in incongruent than
congruent trials. Furthermore, a failure to perceive the true affect-
origin could increase the likelihood of misattributions, resulting
in more frequent affect misattributions following non-conscious
than conscious distractors (cf. Murphy and Zajonc, 1993).
At the end of each block, we also measured the participants’
awareness of the distractors. This was done to ensure that our
participants were indeed not aware of the masked, non-conscious
distractors, as well as to ensure that our participants were aware of
the clearly visible, conscious distractors. In this awareness test, we
applied the chance-level performance criterion of unawareness
(Klotz and Neumann, 1999; Schmidt and Vorberg, 2006). In each
trial of the awareness test, participants had to decide if they
though the current prime was a square or a diamond. In this
awareness test, chance performance means that the participants
were unable to successfully discriminate between the distractor
shapes and, thus, that the participants were unaware of the
distractors. In contrast, above chance performance could mean
that (1) masking was not perfect, such that on some trials the
distractors were visible and participants were aware of them,
or that (2) there distractors are processed in a consciousness-
independent way, allowing above chance performance without
conscious access to them. Despite these limitations, we expected
chance-level performance in the non-conscious condition but
better than chance performance in the conscious condition.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight participants (15 female, 13 male, MAge = 24.05,
SDAge = 8.64) were tested. We calculated this sample size and all
following sample sizes by using G∗Power (Faul et al., 2009) under
the assumption of a small to medium effect size and a statistical
power of 90%. Two participants were excluded due to more than
20% errors. Here and in all following experiments, participants
received course credit, were right-handed, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no prior experience
with Chinese symbols. Prior to all experiments, all participants
gave written consent and were informed that participation
and data collection were fully anonymous. Participants could
withdraw at any time during the experiment without any further
consequences. All studies were conducted in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki (revised, 1983) and the guidelines of the
Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna. We further followed
the Austrian Universities Act, 2002 (UG2002) – which was active
at the time of the experiments – which required only medical
universities to appoint ethics committees for clinical testing,
application of medical methods and applied medical research.
Therefore, no additional ethical approval was sought.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was programmed and controlled using Matlab
7.7.0 (The MathWorks inc., Natick, MA, USA) and the
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Viewing
distance was stable at 57 cm, supported by a chin and forehead
rest. Responses were manual key presses with the left versus right
index finger on a keyboard. Target responses were given through
the keys ‘f ’ and ‘j’. Targets and distractors (1.5◦ × 1.5◦) were
squares and diamonds (Klotz and Neumann, 1999). To decrease
participants’ awareness of the distractors, in the non-conscious
condition, we used circular metacontrast masks that were neutral
with respect to the response-relevant angular target shapes
(2◦ × 2◦). A fixation-cross (0.5◦ × 0.5◦) was displayed at screen
center. Targets appeared always on the screen’s vertical meridian,
6.2◦ equally likely above or below the fixation-cross. Distractors
and masks were placed equally distant (2.2◦) left and right of
the target. In half of the trials, target and distractors were of the
same shape (congruent trials). In the other half of the trials, target
and distractors were of different shapes (incongruent trials). All
stimuli were colored black (CIE Lab: 0.9/−0.3; 0.8 cd/m2) and
were presented against a gray background (CIE Lab: 0.9/−8.4;
31.1 cd/m2).
Randomly, one third of the trials were followed by a rating
task with a black Chinese symbol (4◦ × 4◦) at screen center.
The symbols were randomly selected from an online English-
Chinese dictionary1. In a pre-study, fresh participants rated a
total set of 700 symbols on valence, arousal, and complexity. To
rule out a priori evaluation differences between the symbols used,
we selected symbols with moderate ratings on these dimensions.
Also, by randomization of the symbols across trials, each specific
symbol was equally likely used in congruent and incongruent
trials. We verified this assumption by conducting chi-square tests
of the occurrence of each individual symbol on each level of
the variables consciousness (conscious vs. non-conscious) and
congruence (congruent vs. incongruent). None of these tests were
significant, all χ2 < 2.59, all p < 0.108.
Procedure
After the fixation display (800 ms), distractors were added
(40 ms), and then, with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 50 ms,
a target was shown for 100 ms (see also Figure 1). Participants
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FIGURE 1 | Example trials of Experiments 1, 2, and 3, with time flowing from bottom to top. The left side depicts a congruent conscious trial, the right side
depicts an incongruent non-conscious trial. Note that only in one third of the trials, participants had to rate a Chinese symbol. The figure is not drawn to scale.
were first tested in the non-conscious block, and afterward in
the conscious block. The order of blocks was kept constant to
ensure participants’ minimal awareness of the non-conscious
distractors prior to the distractor-awareness test at the end of the
experiment (see below). Participants pressed the left or right key,
with each key mapped to a specific target shape (counterbalanced
across participants). An on-screen feedback informed about too
slow (>1 s) or erroneous responses. In one third of the trials,
following target discrimination, participants rated the valence of
a Chinese symbol as either negative (left key) or positive (right
key). This mapping was the same for all participants since the
dominant hand seems to be associated with positive concepts
(Casasanto, 2009). In total, the experiment consisted of 768
trials.
In a separate part at the end of the experiment, participants’
awareness of the distractors was assessed. Participants were
informed about the presence and identities of the distractors,
and their task was to discriminate and report distractor
identities. Across trials, stimulus-to-response (S-R) mapping
varied randomly (announced via presentation of a post-target
onscreen mapping rule). S-R mapping rules varied from trial to
trial and were only specified after the targets to ensure that the
awareness test was exclusive – that is, that the awareness test
was only sensitive for the conscious perception of the primes
(cf. Reingold and Merikle, 1988). If we would have used a
fixed S-R mapping rule for different distractor shapes, which
the participants knew in advance of the distractors, awareness-
independent response specification by the masked distractors
could have contributed to the number of correct responses
in the awareness test (see Experiment 4 of Neumann and
Klotz, 1994). This would have yielded a non-exclusive measure
of distractor awareness – that is, an “awareness score” that
does not deserve this label as it would have reflected both
awareness-dependent and awareness-independent contributions
of distractor processing. As only awareness was to be measured
by this test, awareness-independent contributions had to be ruled
out. In total, the distractor visibility assessment block consisted
of 320 trials. In general, independence of awareness was to
be ensured by participants’ chance-level performance in this
awareness-test block. However, one problem with this kind of
criterion is that a non-significant p-value of a t-test against chance
performance (50%) or zero does not inform us about whether
truly no effect was found or our test was insensitive to the
effect (see Dienes, 2014). To resolve this problem, we additionally
conducted Bayesian Factor (BF) analysis of the corresponding
t-tests (Rouder et al., 2009), with an R scale of 1. Here we reported
the scaled JZS Bayes factor values. They indicate the relation
between the probabilities of the data being in favor of the null
relative to being in favor of the alternative hypothesis (or vice
versa). On the basis of Jeffreys (1961) convention, a Bayes factor
greater than 3.00 was considered as a substantial evidence in favor
of the null or the alternative hypothesis accordingly (Dienes,
2011).
Results
Reaction Times (RTs)
Trials with erroneous responses (8.80%) were analyzed separately
(see below). Mean correct reaction times (RTs) were subjected
to a repeated-measurements analysis of variance (ANOVA), with
the within-participant variables consciousness (conscious; non-
conscious) and congruence (congruent; incongruent). Where
appropriate, degrees of freedom were Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected. For better transparency, the uncorrected degrees of
freedom but the corrected p-values are reported. Figure 2 (left
panel) illustrates the results.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 453
fpsyg-08-00453 March 23, 2017 Time: 15:30 # 5
Goller et al. Non-conscious Processing and Affect Misattributions
FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction time (RT) to target shapes (Left) and percentage of negative ratings of neutral symbols (Right) for Experiment 1. Congruent and
incongruent trials are indicated on the x-axis. The separate lines illustrate conscious (solid lines) and non-conscious (dashed lines) trials. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean (SEM).
Besides main effects of consciousness, F(1,25) = 73.55,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.75, and congruence, F(1,25) = 102.12,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.80, we also found an interaction,
F(1,25) = 40.86, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62. In the conscious block,
mean RT was lower in congruent (492 ms) than incongruent trials
(548 ms), t(25) = −12.73, p < 0.001, d = 3.53. The same was
true of the non-conscious block (congruent: 562 ms; incongruent:
582 ms), t(25) = −4.08, p < 0.001, d = 1.13, but the congruence
effect (incongruent RT minus congruent RT) was significantly
larger in the conscious (56 ms) than in the non-conscious (20 ms)
block, t(25)= 6.39, p < 0.001, d = 1.77.
Since the to-be-rated symbol was only shown in a third of all
trials, we conducted a separate, complementary analysis of the
RTs on only those trials in which a Chinese symbol had to be
rated. The results were essentially the same as above. We had
two significant main effects and an interaction (all F > 20.13, all
p< 0.001). Again, RTs were faster in congruent than incongruent
trials in both the conscious (489 ms vs. 550 ms), t(25) = −10.07,
p < 0.001, d = 2.79), and the non-conscious block (563 ms vs.
582 ms), t(25) = −2.55, p < 0.001, d = 0.71). Additionally, the
congruence effect was larger in the conscious (61 ms) than the
non-conscious (19 ms) block, t(25)= 4.49, p < 0.001, d = 1.24.
Error Rates (ERs)
The arcsine transformed error rates (ERs) were subjected to
a similar ANOVA as was used for RTs. A main effect of
congruence, F(1,25) = 40.30, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62, interacted
with consciousness, F(1,25) = 39.74, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61.
No main effect of consciousness was found, F = 0.27. In the
conscious block, we found higher ERs in incongruent (11.54%)
than congruent (4.70%) trials, t(25)=−7.39, p< 0.001, d= 2.05.
No such difference was found in the non-conscious block (7.05%
vs. 7.51%), t(25)=−1.23, p= 0.230, d = 0.34.
Ratings of the Chinese Symbols
From all correct flanker-task trials, we computed the probabilities
of negative ratings of the Chinese symbols for each participant
and combination of consciousness and congruence. Across
all conditions, the probability of a negative rating was not
significantly different from 50%, t-test against 50%: t(25) = 1.27,
p = 0.215, d = 0.35, BF = 3.10 in favor of the null hypothesis.
The same was true for separate analyses of the non-conscious,
t(25) = 1.16, p = 0.124, d = 0.45, BF = 3.50 in favor of the null
hypothesis, and the conscious, t(25) = 1.02, p = 0.316, d = 0.28,
BF = 4.03 in favor of the null hypothesis, blocks. This indicates
that on average symbols were rated relatively neutral, meaning
that no general a priori trend for negative or positive ratings of
the Chinese symbols was present.
A repeated-measurements ANOVA of the arcsine transformed
probabilities of negative ratings revealed an interaction between
congruence and consciousness, F(1,25) = 9.75 p = 0.004,
η2p = 0.28. No significant main effects were found, both F < 0.61,
both p< 0.249. Figure 2 (right panel) illustrates the results. In the
non-conscious block, participants rated the symbols more often
as negative in incongruent trials (50.00%) than congruent trials
(43.65%), t(25)= 3.46, p= 0.002, d= 0.96, BF= 17.33 in favor of
the alternative hypothesis. Most notably, no such difference was
found in the conscious block (congruent: 48.27%; incongruent:
45.09%), t(25) = 1.27, p = 0.216, d = 0.35, BF = 3.10 in favor of
the null hypothesis.
Distractor Awareness
Awareness of the distractors was assessed by d’ (Green and Swets,
1966/1974). Scores of d’ were obtained from direct calculation
of hit rates and false alarm rates. For the calculation of d’,
diamonds counted as signals and squares as noise. Here, d’ is the
z-transformed false alarm rate subtracted from the z-transformed
hit rate. This index becomes zero in the case of chance
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performance (i.e., unawareness), and it can infinitely increase
with ever increasing discrimination performance. Performance
was above chance in conscious trials (d’ = 1.05), t-test against
zero: t(25) = 5.32, p < 0.001, d = 1.47, BF = 1435.32 in favor
of the alternative hypothesis, and not different from chance in
non-conscious trials (d’ = 0.08), t-test against zero: t(25) = 0.78,
p > 0.249, d = 0.22, BF = 4.94 in favor of the null hypothesis.
To exclude the possibility of a response bias, or more
importantly, different response biases in the conscious and non-
conscious trials, we also analyzed the criterion β, which is
calculated as the ratio between the likelihood of choosing one
response in signal trials and the likelihood of choosing the same
response in a noise trial (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). This
ratio becomes 1 if participants favor neither response over the
other. The β values were not significantly different in conscious
(β = 1.07) and non-conscious (β = 1.18) trials, t(25) = 0.41,
p > 0.249, d = 0.11, BF = 6.10 in favor of the null hypothesis.
Discussion
We see from the chance performance in the distractor-awareness
tests of the non-conscious block that participants were not aware
of the masked distractors. Although non-conscious distractors
elicited a response conflict, as shown in the RTs, the true
origin of this conflict in the target-distractor relation, therefore,
remained unknown to the participants. This should have led
to an active search for an alternative origin of the conflict-
elicited affect–that is, an alternative origin to the distractor-target
congruence versus incongruence. In line with this expectation,
neutral Chinese symbols following the targets were judged more
often as negative following a non-conscious incongruent than
following a non-conscious congruent distractor. Participants
evidently misattributed the origin of their negative affect to
a neutral stimulus in close temporal vicinity: the Chinese
symbol.
Crucially, in line with a supportive role of unawareness
of the true affect-origins for affect misattribution, no affect
misattributions were found following conscious distractors:
With conscious congruent and incongruent distractors, equal
proportions of negative and positive judgments were observed,
although the RTs were clearly influenced by conscious target-
distractor congruence/incongruence, too: Conscious distractors
produced an even stronger effect on RTs than non-conscious
distractors (for a similar finding see Tapia et al., 2010). Together
with the results of the non-conscious block, the data amount
to a double dissociation between response priming and affective
priming. While response priming was stronger in conscious
than non-conscious blocks, affective priming was stronger in
non-conscious than conscious blocks. This means that the
difference in terms of affective priming was not simply due
to a stronger response-congruence effect in the non-conscious
block.
A stronger misattribution effect with non-conscious than
conscious distractors is in line with our predictions (see also
Murphy and Zajonc, 1993, for an exposure-elicited affect
misattribution). However, an entire lack of affect misattributions
following conscious distractors is at variance with affect
misattributions following conscious Stroop trials in the study
of Fritz and Dreisbach (2013). One decisive difference between
the present study and the one by Fritz and Dreisbach (2013)
was that participants did not respond to the Stroop target itself
but only had to judge the Chinese symbol following the Stroop
target. In contrast, in the rating trials of the present experiment,
participant first had to respond to the target of the flanker
task and then rated the Chinese symbol following the target.
Therefore, the use of no-go trials prior to the symbol ratings in the
study of Fritz and Dreisbach (2013) was maybe critical for affect
misattributions in conscious target-distractor trials. For instance,
responding correctly to the flanker targets in the incongruent
trials of the present study could have changed our participants’
evaluation of conflict from negative to more positive (Schouppe
et al., 2015). Therefore, our participants could have felt more
positive about their successful response to a target following a
conscious incongruent distractor than the participants of Fritz
and Dreisbach (2013). Additionally, our participants might have
felt less positive about their correct responses to non-conscious
incongruent distractors simply because our participants would
have failed to register the non-conscious incongruent distractor
as a challenge in the first place. Consequently, only the present
conscious incongruent distractors, but not the non-conscious
incongruent distractors might have prompted positive feelings of
success that counteracted the negative affective responses (and
their misattributions to the symbols).
One last point needs also mentioning: Our participants might
have associated the response key with the valence conveyed by
the distractor-target pair (see Gawronski and Ye, 2014), meaning
that a repetition of the response key (e.g., right key for square
and the same right key for a positive evaluation) might have
influenced the ratings in some cases. To clarify these issues, we
conducted Experiment 2, in which our participants rated the
Chinese symbols in go and no-go trials, the former replicating our
Experiment 1, the latter being more similar to the experimental
setup of Fritz and Dreisbach (2013).
EXPERIMENT 2
We used a go/no-go flanker task, where participants had to react
to a target shape (e.g., a square, the go target) and had to withhold
their response if the alternative target shape was presented (e.g.,
a diamond, the no-go target). Shortly before the target, the
distractors were presented in the same manner as in Experiment
1. A no-go distractor is incongruent to the go target and
accordingly delays the go response (for congruence effects with
non-conscious distractors in the go/no-go task see Experiment
5 of Ansorge, 2004). We expected an RT congruence effect in
the go trials, and affect misattributions based on congruence
versus incongruence in go and no-go trials. If the participants’
unawareness of the distractors facilitated affect misattributions,
we expected more misattributions following non-conscious than
conscious distractors. However, if in Experiment 1 overt correct
responses to conscious incongruent distractors changed the
evaluations and prevented a misattribution effect, we expected
more misattributions following conscious distractors in the
present no-go than go trials.
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Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight participants were tested. Two participants were post
hoc excluded due to more than 20% errors in the flanker task. The
final sample consisted of 17 females and 9 males (MAge = 23.46,
SDAge = 3.59).
Apparatus and Stimuli
These were the same as in Experiment 1, with two exceptions. To
reduce visual crowding and task difficulty, we reduced distractor
and target eccentricities to 4.5◦ (6.2◦ in Experiment 1), and
slightly increased target-distractor distances to 2.5◦ (2.0◦ in
Experiment 1).
Procedure
The sequence of events in a trial was as in Experiment 1 (see
Figure 1), but the task was changed. If the target was a diamond
(or a square, counterbalanced across participants), participants
pressed the spacebar. Otherwise, they had to withhold their
response and to wait until the next trial started. There was a fixed
time window of 1 s for participants to give their answer (in go
trials) or to wait (in no-go trials). Otherwise the task and the
procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.
Results
Reaction Times (RTs)
All error trials (7.55%) were excluded and analyzed separately
(see below). Main correct go-trial RTs were subjected to a
repeated-measurements ANOVA, with the within-participant
variables consciousness (conscious; non-conscious) and
congruence (congruent; incongruent), analogous to Experiment
1. The results are shown in Figure 3 (left panel). Besides
significant main effects of consciousness, F(1,25) = 11.14,
p= 0.003, η2p = 0.31, and congruence, F(1,25)= 54.58, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.69, we also found an interaction between these variables,
F(1,25) = 8.19, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.25. Similar to Experiment 1,
RTs were faster in congruent than incongruent trials for both
the non-conscious (congruent: 547 ms; incongruent: 572 ms),
t(25) = 5.08, p < 0.001, d = 1.41, and the conscious (congruent:
517 ms; incongruent: 558 ms), t(25) = 7.25, p < 0.001, d = 2.01)
block. Again, the RT congruence effect (incongruent RT minus
congruent RT) was significantly larger in conscious (41 ms) than
non-conscious (25 ms) blocks, t(25) = 2.86, p = 0.008, d = 0.79.
An analysis restricted to only the trials where a symbol was rated,
yielded essentially the same results.
Error Rates (ERs)
The arcsine transformed mean ERs were subjected to a similar
ANOVA, with the additional variable of task (go; no-go). The
main effects of task, F(1,25) = 11.84, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.32,
and congruence, F(1,25) = 41.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62, as
well as the interactions between consciousness and congruence,
F(1,25) = 4.83, p = 0.037, η2p = 0.16, and task and
congruence, F(1,25) = 11.26, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.31, are best
explained by looking at the interaction between all three factors,
F(1,25) = 8.62, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.26. No other main effects or
interactions were found, all non-significant F < 0.07.
To explore the significant three-way interaction, we conducted
separate ANOVAs for the go and no-go trials. In the go
trials, we obtained a significant main effect of congruence,
F(1,25) = 38.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61, and an interaction with
consciousness, F(1,25) = 9.53, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.28. No main
effect for consciousness was found, F = 0.10. In the conscious
block, ERs were higher in incongruent (11.18%) than congruent
(2.69%) trials, t(25) = 5.73, p < 0.001, d = 1.59. In the non-
conscious block, a similar pattern was found (incongruent: 8.71%;
congruent: 4.66%), t(25) = 3.58, p = 0.001, d = 0.99. Analogous
to the RTs, the ER congruence effect was larger in the conscious
(8.48%) than in the non-conscious (4.04%) block, t(25) = 3.09,
p= 0.005, d = 0.86.
In the no-go trials, only a main effect of congruence was
found, F(1,25) = 11.37, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.31, indicating a higher
ER in incongruent (4.43%) than congruent (2.84%) trials. No
other effects were found for the no-go trials, all non-significant
F < 0.02.
Ratings of the Chinese Symbols
The analysis was based on correct flanker-task trials only. No
overall bias toward negative (or positive) evaluations was found,
t-test against 50%: t(25)=−0.49, p > 0.249, d = 0.13, BF = 5.89
in favor of the null hypothesis. The same holds almost true if
tests were conducted separately for the non-conscious block,
t(25) = −1.76, p = 0.090, d = 0.49, BF = 1.60 in favor of
the null hypothesis–this value is less than 3, and therefore not
substantial evidence–, and the conscious block, t(25) = −0.52,
p > 0.249, d = 0.14, BF = 5.81 in favor of the null hypothesis.
A repeated-measurements ANOVA, with the same variables as in
the ERs, revealed a main effect of consciousness, F(1,25) = 4.84,
p = 0.037, η2p = 0.16, and an interaction between consciousness
and congruence, F(1,25) = 9.16, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.27. In the
non-conscious block, participants rated the symbols less often
as negative in congruent (43.13%) than incongruent (49.00%)
trials, t(25) = 2.88, p = 0.008, d = 0.80, BF = 4.88 in favor
of the alternative hypothesis. There was no such difference in
the conscious block (congruent: 52.51%; incongruent: 50.71%),
t(25) = 1.46, p = 0.157, d = 0.41, BF = 2.45 in favor of the null
hypothesis. Furthermore, we found a strong trend toward a main
effect of task, F(1,25) = 4.06, p = 0.055, η2p = 0.14, with a lower
proportion of negative ratings in go trials (47.16%) than no-go
trials (50.51%). A follow-up Bayesian t-test with a Bayes factor of
1.84 indicates, however, that this trend is not entirely conclusive.
No other effects were found, all non-significant F < 3.13, all
p > 0.089. Figure 3 (right panel) illustrates the results.
Distractor Awareness
Distractor discrimination was above chance in the conscious
trials (d’ = 1.32), t-test against zero: t(25) = 6.96, p < 0.001,
d = 1.93, BF = 68177.77 in favor of the alternative hypothesis,
and not different from chance in the non-conscious trials
(d’= 0.07), t(25)= 0.64, p> 0.249, d= 0.18, BF= 5.43 in favor of
the null hypothesis. No difference in the response bias was found
between the conscious trials (β = 1.06) and non-conscious trials
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FIGURE 3 | Mean RT to target shapes (Left) and percentage of negative ratings of neutral symbols (Right) for Experiment 2. Congruent and incongruent trials
are indicated on the x-axis. The separate lines illustrate conscious (solid lines) and non-conscious (dashed lines) trials. Error bars represent SEM.
(β = 0.99), t(25) = 1.20, p = 0.240, d = 0.33, BF = 3.35 in favor
of the null hypothesis.
Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed that affect misattributions were
restricted to the non-conscious distractors. With conscious
distractors, congruence-elicited affect misattributions were
missing in go and no-go trials. The results are in line with a
critical role of unawareness for affect misattributions to the
neutral symbols (as in Experiment 1). In contrast, successful
conscious discrimination of the incongruent distractors just prior
to a symbol was not responsible for lacking affect misattributions
following conscious distractors. Otherwise, we would have found
a difference between the ratings of the symbols in go and no-go
trials.
We also observed some evidence for another congruence-
independent type of affect misattribution to neutral symbols that
was based on events of which the participants were aware: a trend
in the ANOVA toward more negative ratings of the symbols in
no-go than go trials. To note, the Bayesian test revealed that
this trend is not entirely convincing. However, if this effect
were real, these affective responses probably reflected “distractor
devaluation,” which denotes that (no-go) stimuli requiring to be
ignored or associated with (response) inhibition are evaluated
more negatively than (go) targets (Raymond et al., 2003; Fenske
et al., 2005). Because this effect, if it existed, was due to the
no-go targets but measured in the evaluations of the symbols,
devaluation would have been due to affect misattribution, too.
Yet, participants were aware of the no-go status of the targets
as indicated by their low error rates in no-go trials, and, thus,
participants must have been aware of the true affect-origins
in these cases. Therefore, even in the present study not all
affect misattributions would have depended on the participants’
unawareness of the true affect-origins (see also Payne et al., 2005;
Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013).
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 2 essentially replicated the results of Experiment 1.
However, both experiments shared one major caveat: Participants
were first tested in the non-conscious block and afterward in
the conscious block. We used a fixed block order to minimize
participants’ distractor awareness or distractor suspicion during
the non-conscious block. Therefore, we cannot be sure
whether our effects were truly caused by the manipulation of
consciousness or whether block order was (partly) responsible
for our results. Maybe participants were just more used to
the method in the later occurring conscious blocks than in
the earlier occurring non-conscious blocks. For instance, if the
participants had learned to actively ignore the unwanted affective
priming influence of the target-distractor congruence on the
symbol ratings, this influence would have had a greater effect
on the affective priming effect in the conscious than in the
non-conscious block.
To address this issue, we conducted a control experiment in
which we replicated Experiment 2, but manipulated distractor
consciousness between participants, not within participants.
We decided to use a between-participants design to rule out
all possible transfer effects between the conscious and non-
conscious blocks. To state the results of Experiment 3 right from
the outset: We essentially mirrored the results of Experiment 2.
Hence, our results truly stem from the manipulation of distractor
awareness.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-six participants were tested, 18 in the conscious condition
(12 females and 6 males, MAge = 21.00, SDAge = 1.88) and 18 in
the non-conscious condition (16 females, 2 males, MAge = 22.00,
SDAge = 6.65).
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Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
These were the same as in Experiment 2, with the notable
difference that participants were tested only in the conscious or
only in the non-conscious block.
Results
Reaction Times (RTs)
All errors (8.59%) were excluded and analyzed separately (see
below). Mean correct go-trial RTs were subjected to a mixed-
model ANOVA, with the within-participant variable congruence
(congruent, incongruent) and the between-participants variable
consciousness (conscious, non-conscious). A significant main
effect of congruence, F(1,34) = 82.71, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.71,
interacted with consciousness, F(1,34) = 6.21, p = 0.018,
η2p = 0.15. No main effect of consciousness was found,
F(1,34) = 0.12. As in Experiments 1 and 2, RTs were shorter in
congruent than incongruent trials for both the non-conscious
(congruent: 558 ms; incongruent: 581 ms), t(17) = 5.43,
p < 0.001, d = 1.81, and the conscious (congruent: 542 ms;
incongruent: 582 ms) conditions, t(25) = 7.29, p < 0.001,
d = 2.43. Yet, the RT congruence effect (incongruent RT
minus congruent RT) was significantly larger in the conscious
(40 ms) than in the non-conscious (23 ms) condition,
t(34) = 2.49, p = 0.018, d = 0.83. As in Experiments 1
and 2, an analysis restricted to only the rating trials yielded
essentially the same results. Figure 4 (left panel) illustrates the
results.
Error Rates (ERs)
The analysis was the same as for the RTs, with the additional
within-participant variable task (go, no-go). The main effects of
task, F(1,34) = 40.25, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54, and congruence,
F(1,34) = 17.17, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34, also interacted with
each other, F(1,34) = 5.12, p = 0.030, η2p = 0.13. Only in the
go trials was the ER higher in incongruent (10.62%) compared
to congruent trials (5.09%), t(35) = 4.56, p < 0.001, d = 1.07.
No such difference was found in the no-go trials, t(35) = 1.73,
p = 0.093, d = 0.41. No other effects were found, all non-
significant F < 2.88, all p > 0.099.
Ratings of the Chinese Symbols
The analysis was based on correct flanker-task trials. No overall
bias toward negative (or positive) evaluations was found, neither
in the non-conscious, t-test against 50%: t(17) = 0.90, p > 0.249,
d = 0.30, BF = 3.81 in favor of the null hypothesis, nor in
the conscious condition, t(17) = −0.69, p > 0.249, d = 0.23,
BF = 4.45 in favor of the null hypothesis. A mixed-model
ANOVA, with the same variables as in the ERs, revealed a main
effect of congruence, F(1,34) = 10.95, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.24,
and an interaction between congruence and consciousness,
F(1,34) = 10.81, p = 0.002, np2 = 0.24. In the non-conscious
block, participants rated the symbols less often as negative
in congruent (47.75%) than in incongruent (55.63%) trials,
t(17) = 4.17, p = 0.001, d = 1.39, BF = 55.39 in favor of
the alternative hypothesis. There was no such difference in
the conscious block (congruent: 48.63%; incongruent: 48.61%),
t(17) = −0.02, p > 0.249, d = 0.01, BF = 5.59 in favor of the
null hypothesis. No other effects were found, all non-significant
F < 2.41, all p > 0.130. The results are illustrated in Figure 4
(right panel).
Distractor Awareness
Participants in the conscious condition could discriminate the
distractor with above chance-level accuracy (d’ = 1.36), t-test
against zero: t(17) = 6.13, p < 0.001, d = 2.04, BF = 2299.58 in
favor of the alternative hypothesis. Discrimination performance
for participants in the non-conscious condition was not different
from chance (d’ = −0.14), t(17) = 1.36, p = 0.191, d = 0.45,
BF = 2.40 in favor of the null hypothesis (corresponding to no
FIGURE 4 | Mean RT to target shapes (Left) and percentage of negative ratings of neutral symbols (Right) for Experiment 3. Congruent and incongruent trials
are indicated on the x-axis. The separate lines illustrate conscious (solid lines) and non-conscious (dashed lines) trials. Error bars represent SEM.
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substantial evidence). No difference in the response bias was
found between the conscious condition (β = 1.22) and non-
conscious condition (β= 0.99), t(34)= 1.40, p= 0.172, d= 0.47,
BF = 3.04 in favor of the null hypothesis.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 and confirmed that the
block order was not responsible for the differences between
conscious and non-conscious blocks. Again, we found a
larger proportion of negative ratings after incongruent than
congruent target-distractor pairs. However, this result was only
apparent in the non-conscious block, not in the conscious
block. Furthermore, we found slower RTs in incongruent than
congruent trials, and this congruence effect was larger in the
conscious than in the non-conscious condition.
One notable difference to Experiment 2 was the absence of
an influence of task (go versus no-go trials) on ratings. This
could be explained by the smaller statistical power of the mixed-
model design compared with the within-participant design of
Experiment 2. Furthermore, the Bayesian t-test of this effect in
Experiment 2 already indicated that evidence of this effect was
not entirely conclusive, so that our failure to replicate this effect
might reflect data insensitivity.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found more affect misattributions following non-conscious
distractors than conscious distractors. Only following non-
conscious incongruent distractors but not after conscious
incongruent distractors, the proportion of negative ratings of
an otherwise neutral symbol increased. This affective priming
effect was likely due to the participants’ lacking awareness
of the non-conscious distractors as the true affect-origins,
as indicated by the participants’ unawareness of the non-
conscious distractors. The unawareness of the true affect-
origins probably facilitated a misattribution of the conflict-
elicited affective responses to the neutral symbols. As such,
the results support a misattribution explanation of the affective
priming effect on neutral symbols (Payne et al., 2010). In
fact, because we found more response priming with the
conscious distractors than with the non-conscious distractors,
the full data pattern amounted to a double dissociation
between response priming (stronger by conscious distractors)
and affective priming (stronger by non-conscious distractors).
This means that simply more response priming by the non-
conscious distractors was not responsible for their stronger
affective priming effect. Instead, the unawareness of the non-
conscious distractors somehow facilitated the affective priming
effect and the awareness of the distractors in the conscious
conditions somehow undermined the affective priming effect.
For example, participants’ awareness of the distractor-target
conflict might have allowed them to correctly attribute their
feelings to this conflict. This in turn could have undermined
any misattributions of the same feelings to the Chinese symbols.
Alternatively, awareness of the distractor-target conflict could
have also allowed the participants to actively suppress the
spread of their feelings to the evaluation of the Chinese
symbols because the Chinese symbols were now clearly
recognized as not being responsible for the currently pertaining
feeling.
To our surprise, however, the results in the conscious
condition were relatively extreme: We found no evidence for
affective priming of the symbol ratings following conscious
distractors whatsoever. This is surprising because a prior
Stroop study found affective priming with conscious Stroop
stimuli (e.g., Fritz and Dreisbach, 2013). Several reasons for
this difference are conceivable. First of all, conflict in Stroop
tasks is not the same as in flanker tasks. Some sources of
conflict in the Stroop task are not effective in the flanker
task. For example, only in the Stroop but not in the flanker
task, incongruent trials created higher attentional demands
during long-term memory retrieval (Keele, 1972; MacLeod,
1991). The reason is that only in the Stroop task, colors
(as targets) and color names (as distractors) were used, so
that long-term memory associations between irrelevant color
names and responses could have contributed to interference in
incongruent conditions. No such long-term memory associations
would have been at work in the incongruent flanker conditions
of the present study. Another difference between Stroop task
and our flanker task concerns the degrees of task conflict in
incongruent conditions. In an incongruent Stroop trial, the
distractors had the potential to elicit task conflict between
the distractor words that tend to elicit their (not instructed)
reading and the target colors that, per instruction, had to
be named (see MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000; Goldfarb and
Henik, 2007). This kind of task interference was absent in the
incongruent conditions of the flanker task that we used here. If
either of the two aforementioned Stroop-specific conflict sources
depends on an awareness of the distractors, the presence of
long-term memory based conflict or of the presence of task
conflict in the incongruent Stroop trials of Fritz and Dreisbach
(2013) could have fostered an affective priming effect of the
conscious distractors on symbol ratings in that study. By the
same token, the absence of the same conflict sources in the
flanker task could have prevented some conflict-dependent
affect misattributions based on the present study’s conscious
distractors.
Moreover, in the present experiments, conflict was elicited
by a target-distractor relation that could follow a different time
course than the Stroop interference. In the present study, we
used distractor-target sequences that were presented 1 s before
and, thus, well ahead of the neutral symbols. In contrast, the
interval between Stroop stimuli and neutral symbols in the study
of Fritz and Dreisbach (2013) was 400 ms which is, relatively
short. Moreover, Fritz and Dreisbach (2015) showed that with
increasing interval between conflicting Stroop stimulus and to-
be-rated neutral stimulus, the effect of incongruent Stroop stimuli
on the ratings of neutral stimuli decreased. Since our procedure
used an interval between the target and the neutral symbol of 1 s,
we might have missed out on time-dependent and more fleeting
affective priming effects in the conscious condition. However,
unless one assumes that the affective priming effect is more
robust and less fleeting in the non-conscious condition, it is not
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clear why the time interval would have selectively influenced the
affective priming effect in the conscious and not in the non-
conscious condition. In other words, our interpretation of a lack
of awareness of the true affect-origin as a supportive factor for
affect misattributions in non-conscious conditions would still be
plausible and not be challenged by this possibility.
CONCLUSION
For many applications, such as for rational decisions based on
evaluations and for attitudes toward objects and persons, it is
important to understand the favorable side conditions of correct
and incorrect affect attributions. This is so important because
the affective responses toward objects and persons shape and
trigger human attitudes toward these objects and persons, and
ultimately determine actions, such as how much another person
is pitied and helped. Here, we have identified non-conscious
processing of affect-origins as a favorable side condition for affect
misattributions away from their true affect-origins and toward
other objects. This finding implies that sufficient awareness of
the true affect-origins is helpful for correct affect attributions and,
thus, could be a precondition for rational human action (see also
Topolinski and Strack, 2009).
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
FG and UA developed the study concept and the study design. FG
performed the data collection, data analysis and interpretation
under the supervision UA. FG drafted the manuscript, both SK
and UA substantially contributed to the interpretation of the
data, and provided many important critical revisions. All authors
approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.
All authors agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work
in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity
of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and
resolved.
FUNDING
Open access funding provided by University of Vienna.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank Adina Pohling and Tamara Moser for
their help with the data collection.
REFERENCES
Ansorge, U. (2004). Top-down contingencies of nonconscious priming revealed
by dual-task interference. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 57, 1123–1148. doi: 10.1080/
02724980343000792
Arnold, M. B. (1960). Emotion and Personality. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press.
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spat. Vis. 10, 433–436.
doi: 10.1163/156856897X00357
Casasanto, D. (2009). Embodiment of abstract concepts: good and bad in right-and
left-handers. J. Exp. Psychol. 138, 351–367. doi: 10.1037/a0015854
Dienes, Z. (2011). Bayesian versus orthodox statistics: which side are you on?
Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 6, 274–290. doi: 10.1177/1745691611406920
Dienes, Z. (2014). Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results. Front.
Psychol. 5:781. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00781
Eriksen, B. A., and Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the
identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Percept. Psychophys. 16,
143–149. doi: 10.3758/BF03203267
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., and Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power
analyses using G∗Power 3.1: tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behav.
Res. Methods 41, 1149–1160. doi: 10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149
Fenske, M. J., Raymond, J. E., Kessler, K., Westoby, N., and Tipper, S. P. (2005).
Attentional inhibition has social-emotional consequences for unfamiliar faces.
Psychol. Sci. 16, 753–758. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01609.x
Fritz, J., and Dreisbach, G. (2013). Conflicts as aversive signals: conflict priming
increases negative judgments for neutral stimuli. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci.
13, 311–317. doi: 10.3758/s13415-012-0147-1
Fritz, J., and Dreisbach, G. (2015). The time course of the aversive conflict signal.
Exp. Psychol. 62, 30–39. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000271
Gawronski, B., and Ye, Y. (2014). What drives priming effects in the affect
misattribution procedure? Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 40, 3–15. doi: 10.1177/
0146167213502548
Goldfarb, L., and Henik, A. (2007). Evidence for task conflict in the Stroop effect.
J. Exp. Psychol. 33, 1170–1176. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.33.5.1170
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G., Sirevaag, E. J., Eriksen, C. W., and Donchin, E. (1988).
Pre-and poststimulus activation of response channels: a psychophysiological
analysis. J. Exp. Psychol. 14, 331–344. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.14.3.331
Green, D. M., and Swets, J. A. (1966/1974). Signal Detection Theory and
Psychophysics (A Reprint, with Corrections of the Original 1966 Ed.).
Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co.
Jeffreys, H. (1961). The Theory of Probability, 3rd Edn. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Keele, S. W. (1972). Attention demands of memory retrieval. J. Exp. Psychol. 93,
245–248. doi: 10.1037/h0032460
Klotz, W., and Neumann, O. (1999). Motor activation without conscious
discrimination in metacontrast masking. J. Exp. Psychol. 25, 976–992.
doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.25.4.976
Kouider, S., and Dupoux, E. (2004). Partial awareness creates the “illusion” of
subliminal semantic priming. Psychol. Sci. 15, 75–81. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.
2004.01502001.x
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an
integrative review. Psychol. Bull. 109, 163–203. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.109.
2.163
MacLeod, C. M., and MacDonald, P. A. (2000). Interdimensional interference in
the Stroop effect: uncovering the cognitive and neural anatomy of attention.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 383–391. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01530-8
Murphy, S. T., and Zajonc, R. B. (1993). Affect, cognition, and awareness: affective
priming with optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
64, 723–739. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.723
Neumann, O., and Klotz, W. (1994). “Motor responses to nonreportable, masked
stimuli: where is the limit of direct parameter specification,” in Attention and
Performance XV: Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing, eds C.
Umiltà and M. Moscovitch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 123–150.
Oikawa, M., Aarts, H., and Oikawa, H. (2011). There is a fire burning in my
heart: the role of causal attribution in affect transfer. Cogn. Emot. 25, 156–163.
doi: 10.1080/02699931003680061
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., and Collins, A. (1990). The Cognitive Structure of Emotions.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Payne, B., Hall, D., Cameron, C., and Bishara, A. (2010). A process model of
affect misattribution. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 36, 1397–1408. doi: 10.1177/
0146167210383440
Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., and Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for
attitudes: affect misattribution as implicit measurement. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 89,
277–293. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.277
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 453
fpsyg-08-00453 March 23, 2017 Time: 15:30 # 12
Goller et al. Non-conscious Processing and Affect Misattributions
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics:
transforming numbers into movies. Spat. Vis. 10, 437–442. doi: 10.1163/
156856897X00366
Raymond, J. E., Fenske, M. J., and Tavassoli, N. T. (2003). Selective attention
determines emotional responses to novel visual stimuli. Psychol. Sci. 14,
537–542. doi: 10.1046/j.0956-7976.2003.psci_1462.x
Reingold, E. M., and Merikle, P. M. (1988). Using direct and indirect measures
to study perception without awareness. Percept. Psychophys. 44, 563–575.
doi: 10.3758/BF03207490
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., and Iverson, G. (2009).
Bayesian t-tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 16, 225–237. doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.2.225
Schachter, S., and Singer, J. E. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological
determinants of emotional state. Psychol. Rev. 69, 379–399. doi: 10.3758/
BF03193692
Schmidt, T., and Vorberg, D. (2006). Criteria for unconscious cognition:
three types of dissociation. Percept. Psychophys. 68, 489–504. doi: 10.3758/
BF03193692
Schouppe, N., Braem, S., De Houwer, J., Silvetti, M., Verguts, T., Ridderinkhof,
K. R., et al. (2015). No pain, no gain: the affective valence of congruency
conditions changes following a successful response. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 15, 251–261. doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-0318-3
Schwarz, N. (1990). “Feelings as information: informational and motivational
functions of affective states,” in Handbook of Motivation and Cognition, Vol.
2, eds E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (New York, NY: Guilford Press),
527–561.
Schwarz, W., and Mecklinger, A. (1995). Relationship between flanker
identifiability and compatibility effect. Percept. Psychophys. 57, 1045–1052.
doi: 10.3758/BF03205463
Stanislaw, H., and Todorov, N. (1999). Calculation of signal detection theory
measures. Behav. Res. Methods Instrum. Comput. 31, 137–149. doi: 10.3758/
BF03207704
Tapia, E., Breitmeyer, B. G., and Shooner, C. R. (2010). Role of task-directed
attention in nonconscious and conscious response priming by form and color.
J. Exp. Psychol. 36, 74–87. doi: 10.1037/a0017166
Topolinski, S., and Strack, F. (2009). The architecture of intuition: fluency and
affect determine intuitive judgments of semantic and visual coherence and
judgments of grammaticality in artificial grammar learning. J. Exp. Psychol. 138,
39–63. doi: 10.1037/a0014678
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P., and Hommel, B. (2010). In the mood
for adaptation how affect regulates conflict-driven control. Psychol. Sci. 21,
1629–1634. doi: 10.1177/0956797610385951
Weiner, B. (1986). An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion. New York,
NY: Springer-Verlag.
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 9,
1–27. doi: 10.1037/h0025848
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Goller, Khalid, Ansorge. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 453
